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Protection without Protectionism? Foreign Investment Screening 
in  Europe  and  the V4 Countries Today – A Comparative Analysis1 
 
Tamás Peragovics2 
 
 
Abstract 
European governments have shown growing interest in investment screening mechanisms in 
order to restrain access of non-EU investors to strategically sensitive industries. Most of this 
interest comes as recent high-profile takeovers by Chinese companies are increasingly 
perceived as detrimental for national security. While the practice of screening investments is 
not new, the strengthening of regulatory oversight in major European countries like the UK and 
Germany indicates a more challenging investment landscape for non-EU investors like Chinese 
companies. The EU also adopted a new framework to screen foreign investments, but it relies 
primarily on member state input and cannot veto actual acquisition plans on behalf of the 
community. While Slovakia has no dedicated investment screening mechanism, Czechia is in the 
legislative process of establishing one. Poland and Hungary, with generally similar screening 
processes, differ in their respective relations with China, spelling doubt over potential foreign 
and investment policy cooperation in the V4. This working paper provides an analysis of recent 
developments in investment screening regulations in Europe, with a special focus on the V4 
countries. 
 
JEL: F21, P33, P45, E61, O52 
 
Keywords: FDI, investment screening, national security, V4 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This working paper provides a comparative analysis of foreign investment screening 
mechanisms in the V4 countries today. As the trade war between the United States and 
the People’s Republic of China wages on, economic relations continue to be weaponized 
                                                 
1 This paper was written in the framework of the National Research, Development and Innovation Office 
(NKFIH) research project  "Non-European  emerging-market  multinational  enterprises  in  East Central 
Europe" (K-120053). 
2 Junior research fellow, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
Institute of World Economics, Tóth Kálmán Street 4, H-1097 Budapest, Hungary. Email: 
peragovics.tamas@krtk.mta.hu 
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between East and West (Harding and Harding 2017), informing a global context in 
which discussions about trade and investment become bound up with discussions about 
security and protection. This trend is also clearly visible in something of a protectionist 
turn in Europe and beyond, with major Western countries worrying about the potential 
security implications of Chinese investments made in key industries and businesses. 
While not every V4 country currently has a national investment screening mechanism in 
place, certain recent changes indicate a growing awareness that exposure to third 
country investors may spell trouble for the respective security interests of the individual 
countries. Therefore, this paper will assess and compare the national mechanisms 
already in place in the V4 countries, focusing on differences and similarities, as well as 
analyzing their potential consequences and intended effects. 
As the national level interest in legal investment screening tools cannot be detached 
from similar developments across the European Union, the paper will also briefly 
discuss the new European framework to screen foreign direct investments originating 
from third countries (EC Press Release 2019b), as well as changes in regulatory 
oversight in two major European countries, the UK and Germany. Therefore, the paper 
assumes that the V4 countries’ motivation to establish investment screening 
mechanisms is not limited to domestic concerns. In fact, in the case of Hungary, for 
instance, some observers claim that the introduction of a national screening mechanism, 
in effect from 1 January 2019, took place in anticipation of an EU-level regime that may 
constrain member states’ discretion to screen foreign investors on their own. While the 
exact consequences of the interplay between national and EU-level screening 
mechanisms are hard to assess, the fact that this particular economic activity will be 
regulated on both national and international levels necessitates some familiarity with 
the broader European context.  
As for the paper’s primary scope and methodology, the comparative analysis focuses 
on the actual legal mechanisms already in place across the V4 countries. Each of the 
mechanisms will be presented in details, drawing out the specifics of the screening 
procedure and its expected effects. In the absence of a legal tool, such as in the case of 
Slovakia, recent developments in investment practices will be discussed instead. Overall, 
the analysis relies primarily on the texts of the national legal mechanisms themselves, 
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coupled with news analysis and media reports that will help reconstruct the region’s 
contemporary investment landscape. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, it begins with a brief conceptual discussion 
clarifying key concepts of the research like foreign direct investment and investment 
screening. The paper then continues with a presentation of recent policy developments 
in Europe, focusing on the EU-level investment screening framework as well as changes 
in German and British foreign investment regulations. The paper will then turn to its 
empirical focus, assessing and comparing the individual investment screening 
mechanism in the V4 countries. The paper concludes by summarizing the key findings of 
the research.  
 
2. Conceptual overview 
2.1. Foreign direct investment 
The term ‘foreign direct investment’ carries mostly straightforward connotations, but 
differences in wording may nonetheless lead to variations in interpretations of what 
counts as a case of foreign direct investment (IMF 2004). Depending on various 
approaches, the actual measurement of foreign direct investment also poses inevitable 
methodological challenges. Conceptually, an authoritative definition is provided by the 
2003 Foreign Direct Investment statistics, published jointly by the IMF and the OECD. 
According to this definition: 
 
“The term describes a category of international investment made by a resident entity in one economy 
(direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in an 
economy other than that of the investor (direct investment enterprise). “Lasting interest” implies the 
existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant 
degree of influence by the direct investor on the management of the direct investment enterprise. 
Direct investment involves both the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent 
capital transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and 
unincorporated” (IMF and OECD 2003, 152). 
 
Importantly, notions of “lasting interest,” “long-term relationship” and “significant 
degree of influence” all imply the existence of some degree of dependency and exposure 
between the investor and its investment. In other words, foreign direct investment 
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inevitably results in transfer of control that benefits the foreign investor. Depending on 
the size of the shares acquired, the influence of the foreign investor over its investment 
can range from relatively insignificant to dominant or overwhelming. The investor’s 
control over its investment is maintained and ensured over time through three key 
components. According to the 2016 World Investment Report of the UNCTAD, equity 
capital (1), or the actual purchase of stakes, is coupled with two additional control 
mechanisms: reinvested earnings (2) and intra-company loan and debt transactions (3) 
(UNCTAD 2016c, 2–3). 
However, since all of the above is a fundamental attribute of any foreign direct 
investment, the recent EU-wide interest in investment screening tools must be 
understood as a reaction to a certain category of third country investors, as well as to the 
group of industries and businesses in which acquisitions take place. The dilemma of 
welcoming foreign direct investment traditionally boiled down to juxtaposing the 
expected benefits and advantages of a planned investment with the potential risks that 
the transfer of control would pose to the recipient country. While the underlying 
premise of this dilemma remains fundamentally unchanged today, the potential 
consequences of a bad decision may leave the recipient country severely exposed to 
foreign actors in key areas of national sovereignty. This explains why the question of 
who exactly controls what industry, and for what purpose, has only become more acute 
in recent years, driving the introduction of national and international protection 
mechanisms in the form of investment screening. 
 
2.2. Investment screening 
According to the 2016 World Investment Report issued by the UNCTAD, the number 
of “investment-related national security reviews” has been on the rise for the past 
decade (UNCTAD 2016a, 95). Despite becoming more and more widespread across the 
globe, the practice of screening foreign investments has no commonly accepted 
definition. However, most manuals and guidelines refer to any national regulatory 
review or screening process whose purpose is the evaluation of planned investments in 
light of their future effects on the recipient country’s national security. The process itself 
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vests the national government with the possibility of rejecting the investment on 
grounds stipulated by the relevant legal provisions. 
 
Figure 1. OECD countries that implemented changes in investment oversight policies or 
introduced new ones, data for 2018 and 2019 projections, 2001-2019 
 
 
Data source: (UNCTAD 2016b, 3) 
Figure 1 indicates OECD data for 2018 and 2019 projections of countries that 
implemented changes in already existing investment restriction policies or introduced 
new ones. Importantly, a sharp increase is visible in 2017 and 2018 in the number of 
countries further strengthening investment screening policies, a trend that is expected 
to continue in 2019. The trajectory also indicates that the amount of countries with 
dedicated policies is approaching 50% of all OECD members. In addition, the figure 
shows that while investment restriction tools were not predominant in the 2000s, they 
have been steadily gaining popularity in the past few years. 
Generally speaking, screening processes begin with the notification of the relevant 
national authority that a particular investment is planned, although in certain cases the 
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procedure can be initiated at the discretion of the government itself. The second part of 
the process entails the actual assessment of the planned investment, to which the 
investors are legally expected to contribute with detailed information. Indeed, many 
national governments reserve the right to reopen a screening case if it comes to light 
that the investors failed to reveal all relevant information with regards to their planned 
investment. The process concludes with the decision of the national government to 
authorize or forbid the planned investment. To varying degrees, the investors are often 
legally allowed to appeal against the decision. In the case of Hungary, for instance, the 
investors do have this option, although their appeal can be made only on procedural 
grounds. 
Substantively, all screening mechanisms refer to criteria of national security to judge 
the potential risks of a particular acquisition. According to most accounts, the invocation 
of national security interests inevitably fuses the screening process with a fair degree of 
discretion at the government’s disposal. In fact, national security entails a long list of 
potential barriers, on the basis of which planned investments can be rejected. These 
include, among other things, references to “public safety, social order, plurality of the 
media, strategic national interests, foreign relations, disclosure of State secrets, 
territorial integrity, independence of the State, protection of rights and freedoms of 
citizens, continuity of public procurements or terrorism related concerns” (UNCTAD 
2016a, 95). In order not to discourage foreign investors from national markets, 
governments need to employ reasonable entry restrictions, keeping in mind that such 
legal obstacles may render other destinations more appealing to investors. More 
specifically, while national security criteria give a wide margin of discretion and 
flexibility for the government, they often fail to deliver clarity and transparency to the 
process, inevitably raising the entry costs for foreign investors. 
Even though investment screening mechanisms are becoming more popular, the 
global currents of investment liberalization remain predominant. According to the 
UNCTAD report, China and India, the two largest emerging economies in the region, 
were at the forefront of gradually opening their respective domestic markets for foreign 
investors (UNCTAD 2016a, 90). This means that despite growing concerns about 
investments originating from certain countries and the rise of protectionist trade 
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rhetoric embraced by US President Donald Trump, the 2018 World Investment Report 
issued by the UNCTAD claimed that the global commitment to open international trade 
and investment appears to be generally intact (UNCTAD 2018, 16). 
 
3. The European investment screening framework and recent 
developments in German and British investment screening regimes 
The V4 countries’ motivation for national investment screening mechanisms cannot 
be meaningfully understood without an appreciation of the larger European context. 
Two particular points will be discussed here, both of which have far-reaching 
implications for the V4 countries. The first is the European framework for screening 
investments that was adopted in April 2019. Even though China is rarely ever singled 
out explicitly as the primary driver of investment screening in the EU, commentators 
agree that Chinese state-owned companies are one of the main reasons for the 
introduction of an EU-level investment regulation. The second topic concerns recent 
developments in German and British investment regulations. 
 
3.1. The EU framework for screening foreign investments3 
While the EU remains the primary destination of foreign direct investment, with FDI 
stocks owned by third country investors amounting to 6,3 billion euros in 2017 (EC 
Press Release 2019b), European concerns have been growing over a number of trends in 
third country investment practices that are detrimental to EU interests and make 
necessary some kind of protection to be put in place. The following factors are most 
often invoked to explain why the EU needs an investment screening framework. 
First, while the EU market is generally open and accessible to third country investors, 
European investors face significant hurdles when entering the domestic markets of third 
countries. The negative effects of this kind of discrepancy are obvious, as European 
companies are at a disadvantage compared to their non-EU competitors. The EU prides 
upon being one of the most open investment regimes in the world (EC Press Release 
                                                 
3 The regulation’s full English text is available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R0452 (accessed: 5 May 2019). 
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2019b), and the European framework for screening investments does not intend to 
change this state of affairs significantly. However, until non-EU countries sufficiently 
open up their domestic markets to EU investors, certain restrictions are required in the 
EU to make up for the lack of reciprocity in market access. 
Second, a working document prepared by the European Commission revealed that 
while advanced economies like the US, Switzerland, Norway, Canada, Australia and 
Japan retain their dominant investor positions in the EU, with 80% of foreign-owned 
assets belonging to them, foreign ownership is remarkably concentrated in key sectors 
of the European economy, such as “oil refining (67 percent of total assets of the sector), 
pharmaceuticals (56 percent), electronic and optical products (54 percent), insurance 
(45 percent) or electrical equipment (39 percent)” (European Commission 2019a, 1). In 
other words, the EU’s potential exposure and vulnerability to foreign control is most 
severe in areas of critical significance, necessitating more systematic regulatory 
oversight of what kind of investors have access to them. 
Third, foreign companies investing in the EU often operate with shady ownership 
chains that are difficult to identify in the absence of a more robust screening mechanism. 
These companies also often entertain close ties with government circles in their home 
country, which spells doubt about their exact intentions and objectives when it comes to 
major acquisitions. This problem has been noted most emphatically with regards to 
Chinese investors. Supported with state subsidies as well as with preferential market 
access domestically, Chinese companies have grown into economic powerhouses that 
are remarkably competitive and successful on the global stage (García-Herrero and Xu 
2017, 2). To fight against these oversized Chinese companies, the EU would need to 
breed its own league of industry champions (Sanderson and Keohane 2018), but major 
merger attempts, like most recently between Siemens and Alstom (EC Press Release 
2019c), tend to be blocked by Brussels following strict competition regulations. 
Therefore, the investment screening framework may help European companies fight an 
otherwise uphill battle by constraining the presence of more competitive foreign 
companies in the European market. As a recent survey showed, more than 80% of 
Chinese companies feel discriminated against in the European market after the 
introduction of the EU-level investment screening mechanism (Lee 2019). 
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The above considerations played a crucial role in driving the creation of an EU-level 
investment screening framework. Following up on the September 2017 proposal of the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the new EU 
legislation on 19 March 2019 (EC Press Release 2019a). The regulation is expected to be 
implemented over the following 18 months. Figure 1. indicates the primary phases and 
steps, as well as the length, of the procedure. 
 
Figure 2. The primary phases of the EU-level screening mechanism. 
 
 
Date source: (European Commission 2019b, 2) 
 
According to European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, “the adoption and 
entry into force of this proposal in an almost record time shows that we mean business 
and that when it comes to defending Europe's interests we will always walk the talk” (EC 
Press Release 2019a). Juncker’s boasting may seem at odds with a framework that some 
commentators called no more than a “technocratic empty shell” (Meunier 2019). In fact, 
while the mechanism encourages the sharing of best practices and provides a 
cooperation framework that improves transparency, the ultimate decision about foreign 
investment projects remains in the hands of individual member states. The framework 
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limits the role of other member states and the EC to providing comments and opinions, 
without requiring the adoption of screening mechanisms at the national level, or the 
standardization of the ones that currently exist across 14 member states.4 The 
framework nevertheless provides more oversight to the EU when projects of “union 
interest” are at stake, such as the Galileo or Horizon 2020 projects. The primary sectors 
that enjoy the protection of the framework are related to “security and public order,” 
such as critical infrastructure and technologies, the supply of energy and raw materials, 
access to sensitive information, and the freedom and pluralism of the media (European 
Commission 2019b). 
Overall, the framework boils down to a loose “coordination and cooperation” tool 
(Percy 2019), rather than a robust screening mechanism similar to the American system 
headed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Most 
importantly, the EU as a collective actor still cannot block investments targeting its 
member states. Nevertheless, the Mercator Institute for China Studies estimates that 
roughly 82% of Chinese mergers and acquisitions in Europe last year, by virtue of the 
sectors targeted, would have come under more scrutiny if the European regulation had 
been in force already in 2018, a number that speaks volumes of the implicit target of the 
EU-level legislation (Hanemann, Huotari, and Kratz 2018, 7). While it remains to be seen 
how the regulation will affect FDI trends and practices, Chinese investments in Europe 
already declined significantly from 111 billion US dollars in 2017 to just 30 billion in 
2018, conforming to a global trend in the past few years (Lee 2019). The EU-level 
framework also has the potential to shed light on foreign investment projects that would 
otherwise pass under Brussels’s radar, as national governments will have to clarify more 
systematically why certain investment plans receive the green light. While the 
regulation is unclear what happens if a member state approves an investment project 
despite a negative opinion from the Commission, there are likely to be some political 
costs of non-compliance. 
                                                 
4 These are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom 
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3.2. Recent developments in German and British investment screening regulations 
The introduction of the European investment screening framework comes at a time 
when member states become ever more sensitized to protecting key industries and 
businesses from potential foreign abuse. This part of the paper will only sketch the most 
noteworthy changes in Germany and the UK in order to provide further context for the 
discussion of investment screening regulations followed by the V4 countries. 
Germany has been at the forefront of restricting foreign investment in strategic 
sectors of the German economy. In December 2018, the German government lowered 
the threshold from 25% to 10% for screening and even blocking acquisitions made by 
non-European investors in strategic sectors, a move that most commentators agreed 
was meant primarily against Chinese companies (Hansen and Nienaber 2018). While 
investment opportunities recently expanded between Germany and China as Sino-US 
trade relations worsened (Lin 2018), a few high-profile acquisitions made by Chinese 
companies in the German economy warranted a tightening of regulations. In July 2016, 
the German Kuka Robotics was acquired by the Chinese Midea, which now holds 95% of 
the German company. While the new owners tried to assuage fears associated with the 
takeover, Kuka’s CEO Till Reuter, who headed the company from 2009 and was 
supposed to remain in his post until 2022, was forced out in November 2018, indicating 
a more hostile management policy than previously expected (McGee 2018). In February 
2018, the Chinese Geely purchased a 9,7% stake in Daimler AG, becoming the biggest 
investor in the German car giant. In response to the deal, Economy Minister Brigitte 
Zypries stressed the importance of keeping “an open economy that welcomes 
investment” but warned that the German government must “keep an especially watchful 
eye” (BBC 2018). The fear is that Chinese companies abuse Germany’s openness in a way 
that serves Chinese industry interests, which contributes to China’s growing 
technological edge over the rest of the world. Lastly, Germany’s influential industry 
association, the BDI, issued a position paper on China that called for a stronger stance by 
the EU against Chinese investors and urged companies to reduce their reliance on the 
Chinese market (Nienaber 2019). 
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The UK has similarly tightened its regulatory oversight of foreign investments, 
specifically in defense and technology sectors. In a white paper published in July 2018, 
the British government revealed details about a legislative reform that aims to expand 
so-called “trigger events.” These include mergers and acquisitions leading to more than 
25% of shares or votes, or “significant influence or control over an entity” (Clark 2018, 
13). Interestingly, the white power estimates that around 200 projects fall into this 
category each year, which will have to be “called in” for governmental investigation, but 
half of them are expected to receive official approval after the initial analysis clears them 
of national security concerns (Clark 2018, 72). According to the Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the British government generally refrained 
from screening foreign investment projects, having screened only one such project last 
year (MacAskill and Martin 2018). 
Much like in Germany, a number of high-profile foreign acquisitions explain the drive 
for more governmental scrutiny in the UK. Though one of the most open investment 
regimes in the world, the UK has seen a few takeovers recently targeting sensitive and 
technologically advanced industries. In July 2018, the planned sale of Northern 
Aerospace to the Chinese-owned Gardner Aerospace was halted after the British 
government intervened for reasons of national security. The project was cleared, 
however, and the acquisition was completed at the end of July (This is Money 2018). In 
May 2017, the Chinese Hytera, a Shenzhen-based manufacturer of radio systems, 
acquired Sepura, a similar company, after scrutiny from both British and German 
regulators cleared the takeover. The project was particularly sensitive, as Sepura is a 
supplier of the UK’s Metropolitan Police as well as the German army (Urquhart 2017). It 
was for this reason that turnover thresholds for review have been reduced from 70 
million GBP to just 1 million in military, dual-use and advanced technology sectors 
(Hanemann, Huotari, and Kratz 2018, 17). 
 
4. Investment screening in the V4 countries today 
The EU-level investment screening framework, along with the strengthening of 
regulatory oversight in major European countries, indicates a general wave of 
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protectionist policy tools sweeping across Europe. As will be discussed below, the V4 
countries are not exceptions to this regulatory mainstream, even if each of the screening 
mechanisms already in place or under consideration has country-specific 
characteristics. This part of the paper sketches the role and purpose FDI fulfilled in the 
V4 region, followed by a country-specific analysis of developments in investment 
screening legislation. 
 
Figure 3. Chinese FDI in the V4 countries, million USD, 2003-2017  
 
 
Data source: MOFCOM5  
 
Foreign direct investment in the V4 countries appeared quickly after 1989 and served 
multiple purposes. Foreign capital was meant to satisfy the short-term needs of national 
economies going through a transformational crisis, filling in the gaps left by a 
retrenching state in the domestic market. On the long term, foreign investments were 
expected to provide new technologies and knowledge, along with an entrepreneurial 
culture on the basis of which the transfer to the free market can be completed. After the 
turn of the millennium and the integration of the region into the NATO and the EU, the 
attractiveness of the V4 region consisted of a number of pull factors, such as the 
relatively cheap but skilled labor force as well as its proximity to major European 
markets (Szent-Iványi 2017, 1–4). In the absence of large domestic markets and national 
                                                 
5 First published in (Szunomár 2018b). 
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resources, most of the V4 countries feature in global value chains as export-oriented 
manufacturing bases (Szent-Iványi 2017, 3), best illustrated by Czechia and Slovakia. 
However, more recent trends also indicate growing interest towards the service 
industries, such as banking, IT or telecommunications. 
Today, the primary foreign investors in the V4 countries come from Europe. In 
Poland, German investments, along with those originating from the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, amount to half of all FDI stock, with manufacturing and financial and 
insurance activities being the primary target sectors (30% and 20%, respectively) 
(Santander 2019). As for Czechia, the same cluster of countries, coupled with Austrian 
companies, are responsible for 60% of FDI stock, operating primarily in the same set of 
industries (Czechinvest 2018, 7). The biggest investors in Slovakia are French and 
German companies, focusing on the energy, automotive, telecommunications and 
services sectors. The picture is similar in Hungary, with 75% of investments originating 
from European partners (Szunomár 2018a). 
Therefore, the V4 countries are not excessively exposed to foreign investors coming 
from outside the European Union. This partly explains why Hungary and Poland have 
only recently established a national investment screening mechanism, in 2019 and 2015 
respectively. Czechia is in the middle of the requisite legislative process, while Slovakia 
shows no interest in such a mechanism yet. Accordingly, there is little to no room yet for 
coordination in screening policy among the V4 countries. 
 
4.1. Hungary 
In November 2018, the Hungarian parliament passed legislation establishing a 
national investment screening mechanism, which entered into force on 1 January 2019.6 
Act LVII of 2018 “on the supervision of foreign investments violating the national 
security interests of Hungary” introduced a mandatory review process for the 
acquisition of stakes by foreign entities in strategically sensitive industries. Foreign 
entities are understood as legal entities unincorporated in the EU, EEA or Switzerland, 
                                                 
6 The full text of the law is available in Hungarian at: 
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=210606.359458 (accessed: 5 May 2019). 
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or private individuals not residing in any of the said areas. According to the government 
decree 246/2018 (XII. 17.),7 foreign investors are required to announce planned 
acquisitions to the Minister of Interior, who conducts the screening process under 60 
days and reviews the specific details of the acquisition and its expected effects on 
national security interests.8 The threshold levels at which the investment has to be 
announced are 25% ownership stake for Hungarian companies and 10% for publicly 
listed Hungarian companies, or if the total share of foreign ownership were to exceed 
the percentage limitations after the acquisition under investigation is completed.9 The 
process also has to be triggered if the foreign investor would acquire, directly or 
indirectly, a “controlling interest” in the company as interpreted according to Hungary’s 
relevant civil law provisions. The category of industries and businesses under the 
protection of the new legislation are the armaments and defense industry, the 
production of dual-use goods, the financial services industry and the banking sector, 
energy industry, the water utilities, as well as information technology. If a foreign 
investor fails to meet its obligations under the new law, HUF 10 and 1 million, roughly 
EUR 30 000 and 3 000, can be imposed upon legal entities and private individuals, 
respectively. The foreign investor can appeal on procedural grounds against the 
ministerial decision at the Budapest-Capital Regional Court. The court, however, cannot 
overturn the decision but can only require the minister to conduct the review process 
again (Peragovics 2018). 
There is no record yet of any foreign investment project under investigation. It should 
be kept in mind, however, that roughly 75% of foreign investments in Hungary originate 
from EU countries, with German investments responsible for 25%, none of which fall 
under the scope of the new legislation. In turn, the investments made by Chinese 
companies, always the implicit targets of European investment restriction policies, 
amount to a meagre 2,4% (Szunomár 2018a). While outstanding in comparison with the 
                                                 
7 The full text of the decree is available in Hungarian at: 
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=211634.361766 (accessed: 5 May 2019). 
8 Under exceptional circumstances, the minister can extend the review period with an additional 60 days, 
potentially suspending the completion of a deal for a total of 120 days. In addition, if the information 
submitted along with the notification is not sufficient, the minister can require the foreign investor to 
provide additional details about the acquisition within 45 days. 
9 This means that an expected increase of even a few percentage points in overall foreign ownership can 
make a difference.  
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rest of the V4 countries, this is still a relatively insignificant number overall. In the 
absence of technologically advanced sectors, the Hungarian economy is also less 
exposed to potential foreign theft of intellectual properties and patents. In addition, the 
Hungarian government maintains excellent political ties with the People’s Republic of 
China today, with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán having announced on 25 April in Beijing 
that the Belt and Road Initiative “is fully in harmony with Hungarian interests” (Belt & 
Road News 2019). Orbán’s is an exceptional voice in the chorus of widespread Western 
concerns about China’s global economic offensive. Indeed, considering Budapest’s pro-
Chinese foreign policy, the new investment screening is meant neither to deter Chinese 
companies from the Hungarian market, nor to indicate a general deterioration of 
economic relations between the two countries. 
Instead, it seems more likely that the new legislation came in anticipation of the 
European investment screening framework, and as a response to the growing popularity 
of investment oversight tools across the continent. Fearing that an EU-level regulation 
would constrain Hungarian autonomy, legislators may have pushed ahead with the law 
hoping that the principle of subsidiarity would leave the country less implicated in the 
European framework. As mentioned above, the EU’s regulation does not require 
member states to establish national screening mechanisms, but it recommends a few 
key principles like transparency and non-discrimination if a member state chooses to 
adopt one. With the Hungarian law already in effect, the process it sets up foreshadows a 
rather obscure and politicized oversight mechanism that is less bound by these 
principles. Another notable difference is that while the EU’s procedure is expected to run 
its course within 35 days, the Hungarian procedure alone lasts for 60, resulting in 
significant delays with which an investment deal can be completed. Overall, while the 
new legislation is not for the purpose of scaring investors away, it does introduce new 
restrictions that make access to certain key sectors more burdensome and lengthier 
than before. 
4.2. Poland 
On 24 July 2015, the Polish Parliament adopted the ‘Act on Control over Certain 
Investments,’ which entered into force on 30 September 2015. The law requires foreign 
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investors to seek prior approval from the Minister of State Treasury before the 
acquisition of stakes in a Polish company operating in a strategic sector. Entities 
protected by the law are listed in the relevant ordinance issued by the Council of 
Ministers, which is subject to change each year (Kulak 2018). The trigger threshold at 
which notification is mandatory is designated at 20%, understood as a ‘material stake’ 
or ‘significant participation’ according to the legislation’s terminology. Polish companies 
protected under the law operate in sensitive sectors, such as in the gas, power 
generation, chemical, petrochemical and defense industries (Stawicki 2015). The 
minister decides within a maximum of 90 days, considering the market share of the 
entity and the scale of the business, whether the acquisition poses a risk to “public order 
or public security” (Caramihai 2016). Failure to comply with the legal obligations may 
result in serious penalties of up to PLN 100 million (circa EUR 25 million), or a prison 
sentence of 6 months to 5 years. 
The Polish mechanism constitutes a much more invasive policy tool compared with 
the Hungarian regulation. For instance, the annual listing of entities protected under the 
2015 law means that the government reserves the right to manually restrict access to 
Polish companies each year, which may translate into an aggressive manipulation of, 
and interference with, foreign investment practices in the country. In addition, the 90-
day screening period allows the Polish government to hold hostage a planned project for 
an exceptionally long time, potentially forcing investors to consider alternative 
destinations where deals can progress much faster with lower entry restrictions. 
Bypassing or circumventing the law is also more severely punished, as the financial 
penalty coupled with a possible prison sentence can be expected to produce tangible 
deterrence effects. In fact, certain commentators claim that the Polish law may come 
into conflict with EU treaty provisions. Specifically, the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union contains prohibitions stipulated by articles 52 and 65 that bar member 
states from imposing arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions on the free movement of 
capital (Caramihai 2016). It remains to be seen whether provisions of the Polish law 
indeed fall into this category. 
As for Chinese investments in Poland, they have been relatively modest, 
demonstrating a steady but rather slow increase across the 2011-2015 period. While 
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Chinese FDI stock in Poland pales in comparison with Germany or even Hungary, 2016 
turned out to be a record year (Lubina 2018, 164). In 2016, China’s Everbright 
International acquired a major Polish waste management firm, Novago, for EUR 123 
million (Messenger 2016). Other notable investments in that year were the construction 
of the Suzhou Chunxing prototype in Gdansk for EUR 37 million, or the acquisition by 
the China Three Gorges Corporation of a 49% stake in EDPR-owned wind assets in 
Poland for an estimated value of EUR 289 million (Vsquare.org 2018). 
Despite this exceptional surge in 2016, Chinese FDI expansion in Poland remains 
wishful thinking rather than reality (Sarek 2018), and the current state of affairs in 
Chinese-Polish relations is no cause for future optimism either. Poland’s unambiguous 
siding with the United States in 2018, best exemplified by the interest in the 
construction of the so-called ‘Fort Trump’ and the ongoing persecution of Polish and 
Chinese Huawei officials, are all signs of tectonic changes in the Chinese-Polish 
relationship (Bachulska and Turcsányi 2019). Citing espionage charges and national 
security risks, the Polish government may implement a blanket ban against Huawei to 
exclude the Chinese company from 5G networks. In fact, Poland also called for a joint 
EU-NATO stance on Huawei (The Guardian 2019), even though the chances of a 
consensual approach are slim as Hungary is unlikely to support an anti-Chinese position. 
Interestingly, it appears that the recent deterioration in Polish-Chinese ties came 
about not because of Chinese companies’ alleged invasion of sensitive industries, even 
though this has been the primary cause of worsening relations between China and major 
Western European countries. Instead, it may be an indirect consequence of Warsaw’s 
raw geopolitical calculation, which prioritizes relations with Washington in the ongoing 
US-China trade war. Of course, the ongoing investigations against Huawei officials 
confirm that the Polish government is also somewhat disillusioned and worried about 
Chinese companies. Regardless of the primary underlying cause, one can expect that the 
Polish investment landscape, with key areas protected by a draconian screening 
mechanism since 2015, will continue to be a challenging environment for Chinese 
investors. 
 
- 19 - 
Tamás Peragovics / Protection without Protectionism? Foreign Investment Screening 
in Europe and the V4 Countries Today – A Comparative Analysis 
 
4.3. Czechia 
Czechia is currently in the process of considering a strengthening of existing 
investment restrictions or setting up a dedicated screening mechanism. Partly in 
response to the EU’s ongoing legislative steps as well as to recent Chinese investments in 
Czechia, the National Security Council created a working group in June 2018 with the 
purpose of assessing the potential establishment of an FDI screening process for reasons 
of national security. According to media reports as well as information available on 
governmental websites (Ministry Release 2018), the Minister of Industry and Trade 
leads an expert-level group tasked with exploring the types of investments and 
economic sectors whose protection warrants specific legal tools. On 24 April 2019, the 
working group held its 4th meeting, focusing on the exact wording of the act, which is 
expected to set up a dedicated investment screening process in the near future (Ministry 
Release 2019). Since the provisions and stipulations of the law have yet to take their 
final form, any assessment of changes in the Czech investment screening environment is 
necessarily tentative at this point. 
In 2016, Chinese investments surged in Czechia, due to acquisitions made by the 
Shanghai-based China Energy Company Limited (CEFC). CEFC established its European 
base in Prague in 2015, supported by the Slovak-Czech-owned J&T Financial Group and 
President Miloš Zeman. In 2016, CEFC wished to increase its share in J&T to 50%, with 
the planned acquisition amounting to EUR 980 million, but the Czech National Bank 
raised concerns and eventually rejected the bid for lack of transparency about the 
Chinese company’s financial resources (Muller 2018). Certain commentators claim that 
successful projects are little more than “trophy acquisitions” that are not followed by a 
further expansion of Chinese investments and have little effect on Czech economic 
growth (Kafkadesk 2019). Another notable investment is CRRC’s, the Chinese train 
manufacturer, acquisition of shares in Skoda Transportation, a key investment step 
towards developing trains for the European market. 
Despite these illustrative projects, investment opportunities have not materialized 
according to previous expectations. In fact, Chinese FDI stock in 2017 amounted to less 
than 1% of total FDI stock in Czechia, falling behind the country’s traditional Western 
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European as well as Korean and Japanese investors (Kafkadesk 2019). In addition, an 
incident gave a sobering example of Czech exposure to foreign abuse. Media reports in 
2017 revealed that the Chinese strategic partner of HE3DA technologies, a pioneer in 
lithium battery production, engaged in intellectual and technological theft. The incident 
was a main driver behind the ongoing legislative process, with growing concerns about 
the potentially malign intentions of Chinese investors. A recent Czech media analysis 
conducted by Chinfluence also revealed that 45% of Czech media between 2010 and 
2017 portrayed China in a negative light, with only 14% of media outlets presenting the 
country in positive terms (Chinfluence 2017). 
In addition, political relations between Prague and Beijing have also soured recently. 
The Czech cybersecurity agency issued a warning in December 2018 about the potential 
threats that Huawei poses to Czech national security. Even though Miloš Zeman, 
seemingly unshakable in his pro-Chinese position, scolded the agency for employing 
“dirty tricks” (Santora and Goeij 2019), the warning indicated that the Czech 
government followed in the footsteps of Poland and the United States. In response, the 
Chinese side stated that the warning had made a “very bad impact.” More recently, 
Mayor of Prague Zdeněk Hřib met with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on 30 March 
2019 (ROC-Taiwan 2019), in clear defiance of the One-China policy that China’s 
international partners are expected to adhere to. The Beijing government retaliated by 
canceling the Chinese tour of the Prague Philharmonic Orchestra, after the musicians 
had refused to distance themselves from the political position of the Prague leadership 
(Kajinek 2019). As politics and economics are not neatly separable dimensions in the 
Chinese mindset, these developments foreshadow difficulties ahead and even a potential 
loss of interest of Chinese investors in the Czech market unless Prague offers visible 
remedies to the Beijing government. Therefore, Miloš Zeman’s hope for Czechia to 
become “an unsinkable aircraft carrier of Chinese investment expansion” remains to be 
substantiated by actual investment projects, as well as with an unambiguous and 
consistent Czech political commitment towards China (Barboza, Santora, and Stevenson 
2018). 
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4.4. Slovakia 
Slovakia currently has no dedicated investment screening mechanism, and there is no 
indication that the country is planning to adopt one in the near future. The EU-level 
framework for screening investments falls under the portfolio of the Ministries of 
Finance and Economy, but a statement released by them indicates no interest in 
strengthening entry restrictions for foreign investors in economic sectors of strategic 
significance. Current restrictions are limited to sector-specific regulations, such as in the 
banking or media industries, where acquisitions can be halted for lack of transparency 
or concentration of power. 
Until 2016, Slovakia did not feature as a major destination of Chinese FDI. In 2016, 
Chinese investments amounted to around EUR 33 million, a small number especially in 
comparison with investments realized by other East Asian countries, such as Japan’s 
EUR 57 million (Davis 2018), or South Korea’s EUR 1 billion (mzv.sk 2019). The biggest 
Chinese investment in Slovakia was the acquisition of Prologis Park Galanta by CNIC, a 
company owned by the Chinese government, for roughly EUR 140 million (Prologis 
Press Release 2017). Other important projects fell through, however, such as the joint 
acquisition of TV Markíza by the Penta Group and the Chinese CEFC. The planned 
takeover also fueled domestic discussions about media pluralism and the potentially 
negative consequences of Chinese-owned media disseminating information in Slovakia 
(Šimalčík 2017). Another acquisition that did not materialize concerned the sale of U.S. 
Steel Košice to Chinese bidder Hesteel Group (The Slovak Spectator 2018). 
In 2017, the Slovak government adopted a strategic document on the country’s 
economic and political relationship with China. This indicated a sharp turn towards a 
more conscious approach to developing relations with China. In addition to taking 
advantage of the 16+1 framework, Slovakia is no exception in wishing to become a ‘hub’ 
and ‘gateway,’ or any of the other geopolitical metaphors used in the region, for Chinese 
trade and investment. While Slovak experts believe that this hope is largely misplaced 
and unrealistic, the country’s railway capacity coupled with its strategic location puts 
Slovakia at an advantage as a possible transit hub in the region, a niche that can still be 
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developed, despite initial slowdowns and hiccups in 2017, in the context of China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative (Van Leijen 2018). 
To make the best of its China relationship, the Slovak government kept a relatively 
low-key, non-antagonistic foreign policy towards the Beijing government. In January 
2019, Slovak Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini stated that Slovakia has no evidence of 
Huawei posing any security threat to the country (Reuters 2019), defying American calls 
to scrutinize the Chinese telecommunications giant more seriously. At the 2019 China-
CEEC summit in Dubrovnik, Pellegrini likewise made clear that Slovakia welcomes 
Chinese investors with “fair, equal and non-discriminatory treatment” (Xinhua 2019). 
However, none of this should be taken as Slovak surrender to Chinese pressure. No 
fundamental change of direction is expected in Slovak foreign policy, whose primarily 
Western orientation seems to be set in stone. Therefore, Bratislava continues its 
balancing act, cautiously exploring and expanding economic relations with China, while 
safeguarding its commitments to the West. 
 
5. Conclusion – protection without protectionism? 
In general, none of the screening mechanisms and oversight policies analyzed above 
are meant to force investors out of domestic markets. Rather, the objective is to achieve 
the best of both worlds: protection without protectionism, a system in which European 
governments directly intervene in acquisition plans without sending the wrong message 
that their country is no longer open for foreign capital. However, by the very focus of 
regulatory oversight, the perception that economics can be decoupled from politics will 
be hard to maintain. Foreign investors may just perceive new investment screening 
policies as inaugurating a more protectionist era in Europe and beyond. After all, access 
will be restricted precisely in those key sectors of the national economy that attracted 
large amounts of FDI in recent years from countries like China. While little information 
is available about how FDI practices and trends change with regards to targeted 
countries and sectors, there is evidence that Chinese companies consider national and 
EU-level screening tools to be discriminatory, meant to curtail China’s burgeoning 
economic presence in Europe. 
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Another finding of the research is that most of the investment screening policies are 
fundamentally reactive, and subject to change in view of ongoing FDI trends and 
practices. The German and British legislative developments neatly illustrated how 
regulatory oversight strengthened in response to specific investment projects. The same 
logic applies to Slovakia, where the very absence of such takeovers explains the lack of 
interest in investment screening. One apparent exception is Hungary. Despite 
introducing a national screening mechanism before the European regulation came into 
force, no takeovers took place recently in key industries that the Hungarian government 
considered hostile or detrimental for national security. Rather, Budapest seems to have 
simply followed the regulatory mainstream in Europe, adopting new legislation that is of 
questionable relevance in the Hungarian investment landscape. The country boasts few 
advanced and technologically sensitive sectors to protect, but maintains excellent 
political ties with non-EU investors like China. 
Within the V4, Poland and Hungary differ in their respective motivations to restrict 
foreign investments. There is little in common between the two national mechanisms, 
except for the generic underlying structure. The Polish law introduced a much more 
invasive system than the Hungarian mechanism, allowing the Polish state to police more 
directly the domestic investment market. As relations deteriorated between Warsaw 
and Beijing following the Huawei scandal, Chinese companies are likely to feature 
among those foreign actors against whom this protection is at least partly intended. 
Coupled with the lack of screening mechanisms in Czechia and Slovakia, this divergence 
in Polish-Hungarian policy motivations implies that V4 coordination in FDI screening is 
currently unlikely. In fact, the different approaches Poland and Hungary exhibit to 
developing relations with China also spell doubt over future foreign policy cooperation 
in the V4. 
Lastly, while the EU-level regulation is seen as a step in the right direction, it 
establishes no more than a cooperation and coordination process, with no ability to 
actively intervene in member state screening decisions. What the framework does 
achieve nonetheless is the further politicization of FDI projects. As governments are 
expected to share sensitive details about acquisition plans with the European 
Commission and other member states, they need to prepare to be scrutinized by the 
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community with regards to their attitude towards third country investors. Therefore, as 
a tool of soft pressure, rather than a robust and invasive screening mechanism, the EU 
framework can still influence member state behavior about welcoming FDI from outside 
of the European Union. 
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